Abstract. Biometric identity-based encryption (Bio-IBE) is a kind of fuzzy identity-based encryption (fuzzy IBE) where a ciphertext encrypted under an identity w ′ can be decrypted using a secret key corresponding to the identity w which is close to w ′ as measured by some metric. Recently, Yang et al. proposed a constant-size Bio-IBE scheme and proved that it is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this paper, we will show that their Bio-IBE scheme is even not chosen-plaintext secure. Specifically, user w using his secret key is able to decrypt any ciphertext encrypted under an identity w ′ even though w is not close to w ′ .
Introduction
To simplify the certificate management in traditional public key infrastructure, Shamir [1] first introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography in 1984. In this scenario, a user's public key is derived from his identity, e.g., his e-mail address, and his secret key is generated by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG) who has knowledge of a master secret key. In 2001, the first two practical identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes were presented in [2] and [3] , respectively.
The notion of fuzzy identity-based encryption (fuzzy IBE) was introduced by Sahai and Waters [4] in 2005, where each identity is viewed as a set of descriptive attributes. A fuzzy IBE scheme is very similar to a standard IBE scheme except that a ciphertext encrypted under an identity w ′ can be decrypted using the secret key associated with the identity w which is close to w ′ as judged by some metric. The error-tolerance property of fuzzy IBE enables biometric attributes to be used in a standard IBE scheme. In 2007, Burnett et al. [5] proposed the first biometric identity-based signature (Bio-IBS) scheme, where they used biometric information to construct the identity of a user. The first biometric identity-based encryption (Bio-IBE) scheme was proposed by Sarier [6] [7] presented an improved Bio-IBE scheme which is secure against a new type of denial of service attack. Recently, Yang et al. [8] presented a constant-size Bio-IBE scheme and proved that it is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this paper, we will show that their scheme is even not chosen-plaintext secure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some preliminaries required in this paper. In Section 3, we review Yang et al.'s Bio-IBE scheme. In section 4, we present an attack on their Bio-IBE scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Bilinear pairing
Let G and G T be two groups with the same prime order p. A map e : G×G → G T is called a bilinear map if it satisfies the following three properties.
1. Bilinearity: For all a, b ∈ Z p and u, v ∈ G, we have e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab . 2. Non-degeneracy: There exists u, v ∈ G such that e(u, v) = 1. 3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u, v ∈ G.
Biometric identity-based encryption
As mentioned above, a Bio-IBE scheme is essentially a fuzzy IBE scheme, with the only difference that it uses a set of biometric attributes as a user's identity. Therefore, a Bio-IBE scheme also consists of the following four algorithms [4] :
-Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG generates a master secret key M SK and the public parameters P P which contains a threshold d. The PKG publishes the public parameters P P and keeps the master key M SK secret. -Extract: Given the public parameters P P , the master secret key M SK and a user's biometric attribute set w = (µ 1 , · · · , µ n ), the PKG generates a secret key sk w for the user. -Encrypt: On input the public parameters P P , a message m and a user's biometric attribute set w
On input the public parameters P P , a secret key sk w corresponding to the user w, and a ciphertext C ′ encrypted under the set of attributes w ′ , it outputs the message if and only if |w
The security notion for Bio-IBE proposed by Yang et al. [8] is indistinguishability of ciphertext under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-sID-CCA2). A weaker security notion proposed in [4] is indistinguishability of ciphertext under chosen plaintext attack (IND-sID-CPA). Its formal definition is based on the following game played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
-Init. The adversary A outputs a target attribute set w
The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and sends the system parameters P P to the adversary A. -Phase 1. The adversary A adaptively delivers secret key extraction queries on many attribute sets w i , where |w
The challenger C runs the Extract algorithm to obtain a private key sk wi for each w i and sends the result to A. 
Fuzzy Extraction
Fuzzy extraction process is essential for many Bio-IBE schemes such as [6, 7, 8] .
k be a finite dimensional metric space with a distance function dis : M × M −→ Z
+ . An (M, l, t) fuzzy extractor consists of the following two functions Gen and Rep:
-Gen: This function takes as input a biometric template b ∈ M. It outputs an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} l and a public parameter P AR. The biometric template b is unique for each user since it is a concatenation of user's biometric attributes.
-Rep: This function takes as input a biometric template b ′ ∈ M and the public parameter P AR. It outputs the identity ID if dis(b, b ′ ) ≤ t. In other words, we can obtain the same identity ID as long as b ′ is "close" to b.
For two biometric attribute sets w and w ′ , we assume that dis(b, b ′ ) ≤ t if |w 
Review of Yang et al.'s Bio-IBE scheme
Let ∆ i,S (x) = j∈S,j =i x−j i−j denote the Lagrange coefficient for i ∈ Z * p and a set S of elements in Z * p . The Yang et al.'s Bio-IBE [8] is specified as follows. Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG does:
1. Choose two groups G and G T with the same prime order p, a bilinear map e : G × G → G T and a generator g of G.
Select two hash functions H : b → {0, 1}
* and H 1 : Z 3. Pick s ∈ Z * p and g 1 ∈ G uniformly at random, and set g 2 = g s . 4 . The public parameters are P P = (G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , d, H, H 1 ) and the master key is s.
Extract: Given a user's biometric attribute set w = (µ 1 , · · · , µ n ), the PKG does:
1. Compute ID = H(b) and P AR = Gen(b), where b is a concatenation of each
Send the private key sk w = (d i,1 , d i,2 ) µi∈w to the user and publish P AR.
Encrypt: On input the public parameters P P , a message m ∈ G T and an identity w ′ = (µ
, the sender does:
1. Get the public parameter P AR of the receiver and compute
Decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext C ′ encrypted under the attribute set w ′ , a user with attribute set w satisfying |w
1. Choose an arbitrary set S ⊆ w ′ w such that |S| = d.
Compute
The Decrypt algorithm works since ID = ID ′ when |w ′ w| ≥ d and
Remark. Compared to the scheme in [8] , there is a small (but important) modification in the above scheme. Namely, we use H 1 (ID) (resp. H 1 (ID ′ )) instead of H 1 (w, ID) (resp. H 1 (w ′ , ID ′ )). We know that, for two random strings w and
) cannot be true in general. Therefore, the original Decrypt algorithm in [8] may fail. In our modified scheme, the Decrypt algorithm will work since H 1 (ID) = H 1 (ID ′ ) when |w ′ w| ≥ d. In fact, H 1 (ID) plays the same role as H 1 (w, ID) in this scheme.
The proposed attack
Yang et al. [8] proved that their scheme is IND-sID-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model. However, in this section, we show that their scheme is even not IND-sID-CPA secure. Assume that the target attribute set is w
A polynomial time adversary A attacks Yang at al.'s Bio-IBE scheme as follows:
1. In the Setup phase, the adversary A obtains the system parameters P P from a challenger C. 2. In Phase 1, the adversary A makes a secret key extraction query on an attribute set w, where |w ′ w| < d. The challenger C runs the Extract algorithm to obtain a private key sk w for w and sends the result to A. 
, A determines the bit b by performing the following steps: (a) For each µ i ∈ w, compute g q(µi) 1
We can verify its correctness as follows: It's clear that Yang et al.'s Bio-IBE scheme is broken. That is their scheme is not chosen-plaintext secure. Notice that, in a Bio-IBE scheme, a user with identity w of course can decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under identity w ′ using his secret key if |w ′ w| ≥ d. Form the above attack, we know that a user with identity w can also decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under identity w ′ using his secret key even though |w ′ w| < d. Consequently, a valid user can decrypt any ciphertext encrypted under any identity using his secret key in Yang et al. scheme.
Conclusion
Recently, Yang et al. [8] proposed a constant-size Bio-IBE scheme and proved that it is adaptively chosen-ciphertext secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, however, we have indicated that their scheme is even not chosen-plaintext secure.
